On April 30, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals issued its much-awaited opinion in Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, in which it held, as argued by attorneys from the Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons Religious Institutions Group, that the First Amendment Doctrine of Church Autonomy precludes civil courts from hearing claims by a youth minister and her partner against the youth minister's church employer and a number of other defendants.

St. Aidan's Episcopal Church in Boulder, Colorado, hired Lee Ann Bryce to serve as its youth minister in 1997. Bryce, a layperson who herself was not a member of the Episcopal Church, also served as the parish's assistant music minister and as a “liaison between the [parish] youth and other parish ministries.” In November 1998 Bryce and her co-plaintiff, the Rev. Sara Smith, celebrated their union in a commitment ceremony at a local Congregational church.

When St. Aidan's pastor and vestry learned of the situation, they informed Bryce that she “was violating Episcopal doctrine, which teaches that people should be married and faithful or single and celibate.” During the parish controversy that ensued, there were a series of church communications about the situation. Bryce had conversations with the pastor, with the vestry, and with the parents of the children served in the youth ministry. The pastor sent “several letters and memoranda to the vestry and other [parish] leaders.” The letters included “information packets” containing articles critical of homosexual practices. There was also a series of four parish meetings “to inform the congregation about homosexuality and Bryce's employment situation.” “Bryce supported the idea of such a parish dialogue, though she objected to the format of the meetings.” Even though “the overwhelming majority of those who spoke” at the parish meetings supported Bryce, she and her partner complained that these meetings and the other church communications constituted sexual harassment. The parish subsequently removed Bryce from her position as youth minister effective June 1999. It allowed her to continue her parish employment in the areas of music ministry and adult education through the end of the year.

Bryce and her partner subsequently sued the parish, its rector, its former assistant rector, 14 vestry persons, the Episcopal bishop, a regional Diocesan missioner, and the Diocese of Colorado in federal court. They alleged that because of the church communications-especially statements contained in the packet of information distributed by the pastor and the statements made at the parish meetings-the defendants should be liable for sexual discrimination and harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. (Bryce and her partner had simultaneous litigation against many of the same defendants in the Boulder District and a charge of discrimination before the City of Boulder.)

In numerous regards, Bryce was a case of first impression for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's dismissal of all claims by recognizing that the First Amendment Doctrine of Church Autonomy deprives civil courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such claims. After reviewing a number of important church autonomy cases, the court concluded that “courts have held that churches have autonomy in making decisions regarding their own internal affairs. This church autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.” Later the court recognized that the Constitution affords particular protection for church communications-regardless of whether those communications are by correspondence, speech, church meetings, or handouts. It held that the “church autonomy doctrine is rooted in protection of the First Amendment rights of a church to discuss church doctrine and policy freely.”

In Bryce, the Tenth Circuit also joined four other circuits (the fourth, fifth, eleventh, and D.C. Circuits) in holding that the 1990 Smith decision, which diminished Free Exercise jurisprudence, did not diminish the Church Autonomy Doctrine in any way.

Recusal. Finally, the Bryce case presented an unusual issue regarding the religious affiliation of the trial judge. In the District Court, Bryce and the Rev. Smith asked the presiding judge to recuse himself from the case because he belonged to an Episcopal parish in Wyoming, and the judge declined to do so. The defendants argued that the judge ought not do so because the U.S. Constitution's sixth article prohibits religious tests for public office. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judge's decision, but it did so on nonconstitutional grounds. The court recognized that other “courts have consistently held that membership in a church does not create sufficient appearance of bias to require recusal” and that these “cases are consistent with other associational bias cases, which have found that group membership alone is insufficient to create the appearance of bias.”

Given the strength of the Bryce decision in the Tenth Circuit and analogous cases elsewhere, churches and denominations should carefully articulate in job descriptions, employment agreements, and other documents whether and how particular employees are engaged in ministry.